ABSTRACT Attribute-based encryption is a popular cryptographic technology to protect the privacy of clients' data in cloud computing. In order to make the scheme have the functionality of comparing ciphertext, Zhu et al. combined concepts of key-policy attributed-based encryption with public key encryption with equality test and proposed key-policy attributed-based encryption with equality test. They defined its security model and put forward a scheme from bilinear pairing. In this paper, we first use two methods to show that their scheme is not secure for one-way under chosen ciphertext attack. Next, we show that the scheme is not secure for a test under chosen ciphertext attack defined in their paper yet. Finally, we point out the definition of a test under chosen ciphertext attack is very strong, which causes no scheme to satisfy the model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, in cloud computing environment, clients are used to store their data to cloud servers in order to save their storage cost. However, to protect the privacy of data of clients, these outsourced data have to be stored in encrypted form which can not efficiently extract some statistical information of the data for users in the future. To keep sharing of encrypted data fine-grained, Sahai and Waters [1] put forth attribute-based encryption (ABE), which is a public key encryption variant that allows clients to access secret information according to their attributes.
In practical applications, there are two different kinds of ABE schemes based on the manner to deploy the access control policy, key-policy ABE encryption (KP-ABE) [2] and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [3] . In the former, The ciphertexts are associated with attributes' sets and the clients' private keys are associated with access policies over these attributes. While in the latter, the ciphertext is associated with an access policy, and the clients' private keys are associated with a set of attributes. However, these schemes cannot perform to compare plaintexts unless it decrypts the corresponding ciphertexts of the plaintexts. Recently, Zhu et al. [4] introduced a new concept by combining the concept of public key encryption with equality test (PKE-ET) [5] and the concept of KP-ABE, called key-policy attribute-based encryption with equality test (KP-ABE-ET). They formally defined the security model and constructed a KP-ABE-ET scheme from bilinear pairing. Furthermore, they showed that the KP-ABE-ET scheme was one-way under chosen ciphertext attack (OW-CCA) and a testable property under chosen ciphertext attack (T-CCA).
A. CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we show that the KP-ABE-ET scheme proposed by Zhu et al. is insecure as follows. We firstly show their KP-ABE-ET scheme is not secure under OW-CCA by using two methods to construct a valid ciphertext, respectively. Then we show their KP-ABE-ET scheme isn't secure under T-CCA yet. Finally, we point out that the definition of T-CCA is not reasonable and redefine it.
B. RELATED WORKS
In 2010, Yang et al. [5] proposed a new concept -PKE-ET, which is a coalition of public key encryption (PKE) and searchable encryption [6] . The PKE-ET not only has decryption functionality, but also has the property of checking if ciphertexts are encryptions of the same unknown keyword even if they are possible to use different public keys. To make checking algorithm fine-grained, Tang [7] improved the scheme to propose a PKE-ET with fine-grained authorization scheme(FG-PKE-ET), allor-nothing PKEET (AoN-PKE-ET) [8] and an extension of FG-PKE-ET [9] . Ma et al. [10] put forward a PKE-ET supporting flexible authorization (PKE-ET-FA). In their scheme they defined 4 types of flexible authorizations. In order to simplify the PKE-ET's certificate management, Ma [11] combined the concept of PKE-ET with the concept of identity-based encryption (IBE) to propose IBE with equality test (IBE-ET). Recently, to optimize the computational overhead, Wu et al. [12] improved the IBE-ET scheme proposed by Ma et al. And Lee et al. [13] proposed Semi-generic construction of PKE-ET scheme and IBE-ET scheme.
C. ORGANIZATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we recall basic concepts which will be used in the paper. We then recall their KP-ABE-ET scheme and show that the scheme isn't secure based on their security models in Section III. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section IV.
II. PRELIMINARY
Here, we first recall some basic mathematical knowledge which was used in their KP-ABE-ET scheme.
A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Set two multiplicative groups G 1 and G 2 with the same prime order q. Let Z * q be the multiplicative group of F q (the finite field). A bilinear map e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 [14] , which satisfies the following three properties:
• Bilinearity: For any α, β, γ ∈ G 1 , e(α, βγ ) = e(α, β)e(α, γ ), and e(αβ, γ ) = e(α, γ )e(β, γ ).
• Non-degeneracy: There are elements α, β ∈ G 1 , such that e(α, β) = 1, where 1 is the identity element of G 2 .
• Computability: For any elements α, β ∈ G 1 , there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(α, γ ). Definition 1: Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDH problem). Set G 1 and G 2 to be the groups of order q above. Given four elements g, g α , g β , g γ ∈ G 1 for some unknown α, β, γ ∈ Z * q , to calculate e(g, g) αβγ .
Where g isn't the identity element of G 1 and e :
Definition 2: Twin-decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (t-DBDH problem). Given two distributions
to decide whether abc ≡ x mod q and aζ τ ≡ y mod q hold or not.
B. ACCESS TREE
Let T be an access tree made up of many non-leaf nodes and many leaf nodes. Each leaf and non-leaf node represent an attribute and a threshold gate, respectively. Each threshold gate is denoted by its children and the threshold value. Set num x and k x as the number of children and the threshold value of the node x, respectively. We have 0 ≤ k x ≤ num x . Then, every leaf node x has a threshold value k x = 1. Let every node's children do have orders which are from 1 to num. Next, we recall the following functions which were defined in [4] . The parent of node x is denoted by function parent(x). An attribute associated with the leaf node x is denoted by the function att(x). And the number associated with node x is denoted by the function index(x).
T r refers to the tree T rooted at the root r. T x refers to the subtree of T which is rooted at node x. The set of attributes S satisfies the tree T x if and only if T x (S) = 1 holds. Here, we compute T x (S) by using the following recursive algorithm.
• Compute T z (S) for all children z of x if x is a non-leaf node. T x (S) outputs 1, if and only if there are at least k x children to output 1.
• Otherwise (node x is a leaf node), T x (S) outputs 1 if and only if att(x) ∈ S.
III. ANALYSIS OF ZHU et al.'s KP-ABE-ET SCHEME
Here, we first recall the concept of KP-ABE-ET and its security models. And then we review the KP-ABE-ET scheme put forth by Zhu et al. and analyze its security.
A. MODEL OF KP-ABE-ET AND ITS SECURITY MODEL
A KP-ABE-ET scheme [4] is made up of six algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Trapdoor, Decrypt and Test. M and C are the plaintext space and the ciphertext space, respectively. The detailed is described as follows:
• Setup(1 k ): On input a security parameter 1 k , generate the public parameter Param and the master key MSK . Keep MSK secret and publish the public parameter Param.
• KeyGen(T , T , S, S , Param, MSK ): On input T , T , and S, S (where T (S) = 1 and T (S ) = 1), the public parameter Param, the master key MSK , generate the decryption secret key SK for users.
• Encrypt(Param, M , S, S ): On input the public parameter Param, a plaintext M and two sets of attributes S, S , generate the ciphertext CT ∈ C.
• Trapdoor(Param, S , T , MSK ): On input the public parameter Param, an attribute set S , an access trees T and MSK , generate the trapdoor TD for users.
• Decrypt(CT , SK , S, S ): On input the ciphertext CT , the decryption secret key SK and two attribute sets S, S , produce the corresponding plaintext M if T (S) = 1 and T (S ) = 1 hold. Otherwise, outputs ⊥ .
• Here, we review the definition of two security properties defined in Zhu et al.'s paper. First, the one-way against chosen-ciphertext attack (OW-CCA) for KP-ABE-ET under a chosen set of attributes is described as follows [4] .
Game 1: Let A be an adversary which interacts with a challenger C. A announces a challenged set S of attributes.
(1) Setup: The challenger C takes as input a security parameter 1 k , and produces the public parameter Param and sends it to A.
(2) Phase 1: A makes the queries below.
• Key retrieve queries: For any access structure T i , the adversary A runs queries of the private keys, where S ∈ T i for any i. C sends the corresponding private key SK to A.
• Decryption queries: when A runs queries for ciphertexts, C uses the Decrypt algorithm to produce the corresponding plaintexts of the ciphertexts or ⊥, and sends it to A.
• Trapdoor queries: C uses the Trapdoor algorithm to produce the trapdoor TD and responds it to A.
and sends the challenged ciphertext CT * to A.
(4) Phase 2: Repeat the Phase 1. The only constraint is that CT * is not queried in the decryption queries.
(5) Guess: At last, the adversary A outputs a plaintext M ∈ M as its guess.
If M * = M the adversary A wins the above game. The advantage of A is defined as the probability Pr[M *
= M ]. Definition 3: The KP-ABE-ET scheme is OW-CCA secure if the advantage of any polynomial-time adversary is negligible in security parameter k in the above game.
Next, we review the definition of a test against chosenciphertext attack (T-CCA) of authorization for KP-ABE-ET under the chosen sets of attributes as follows.
Game 2: Let A be an adversary which interacts with a challenger C. A publishes two challenged sets of attributes S, S . Here, S ∩ S = , and S and S are used for decryption and the trapdoor, respectively.
(1) Setup: The challenger C takes as input a security parameter 1 k and uses the Setup algorithm of KP-ABE-ET to produce the public parameters Param and sends it to A.
• Key retrieve queries: For access structures T i and T j , A can make the private keys' queries, where S ∈ T i for all i and S ∈ T j for all j. C sends the corresponding private key SK to A.
• Decryption queries: A can make the decryption queries for ciphertexts. C uses the decrypt algorithm to produce the corresponding plaintext, and sends it to A.
• Trapdoor queries: When A makes the Trapdoor queries, C uses the trapdoor algorithm to produce TD and sends it to A.
• Test queries: When A makes test queries for some ciphertexts, C outputs 1 for equality ciphertexts by running the test algorithm; it outputs 0, otherwise.
and sends the challenged ciphertexts CT * 1 , CT * 2 to A. If c = 0, then C randomly selects two distinct plaintext M 1 and M 2 , outputs
and sends the challenged ciphertexts CT * 1 , CT * 2 to A. 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE KP-ABE-ET SCHEME
Since the KP-ABE-ET scheme proposed by Zhu et al. is somewhat complex, we recall their scheme in APPENDIX A.
Zhu et al. had shown that their scheme satisfies OW-CCA security and T-CCA security. However, we will show that both security properties don't hold.
1) THE SCHEME ISN'T SECURE FOR OW-CCA
Now, we analyze the OW-CCA security of the KP-ABE-ET scheme.
From the definition of Game 1, we know that any adversary can request key retrieve queries, decryption queries and trapdoor queries before and after the challenger generates the challenge ciphertext CT * . The only restricted condition is that the adversary can't make the decryption query for CT * . Thus, when the adversary has gotten the challenge ciphertext CT * of some plaintext M * which is chosen randomly by the challenger. It can generate a new ciphertext CT according to the following two constructions, respectively. Here, set
, where
The adversary firstly submits CT * and S * to request a trapdoor query to get the corresponding trapdoor TD. Next, it uses the trapdoor TD to compute
and then it randomly chooses an element r 3 ∈ Z q to compute
Obviously, the ciphertext C ( = CT * ) is valid and its corresponding plaintext is M * . Because the challenged ciphertext is a valid ciphertext, and the value of C 3 is (M * ) r 1 , which is a correct value by using the trapdoor TD to calculate. Subsequently, the adversary produces C 3 and C 5 by choosing a random element r 3 ∈ Z q and running the Encryption algorithm. The probability of that r 3 equals the unknown element r 3 is 1 q , which is negligible. Since (S * , S * , C * 1 , C * 2 , C * 4 ) is gotten from the challenger which is a part of challenge ciphertext, the adversary can easily compute the value of C 6 , that is,
. Next, according to the Game 1, the adversary can request a decryption query for any ciphertext C = C * . The challenger decrypts C to get the plaintext by using the decryption algorithm and returns the corresponding plaintext of the query. Actually, the plaintext of C is M * . Thus, the probability of that the adversary wins the Game 1 is 1.
b: THE SECOND CONSTRUCTION
This construction is easy and rough, but effective. When the adversary gets the challenge ciphertext CT * , it randomly chooses C 3 , and produces C 5 = {E j } j∈S for randomly choosing E j ∈ G 1 , and then it calculates
The ciphertext C ( = CT * ) is also valid and its corresponding plaintext is M * . Because the challenge ciphertext CT * is valid firstly, and
always hold for the unknown elements r 1 , r 2 . From the construction of their decryption algorithm, to compute M * r 1 is only to utilize S, C * 2 , C * 4 . Thus, the two equalities C * 1 = g r 1 and
Next, according to the Game 1, the adversary can request a decryption query for ciphertext C = C * . The challenger decrypts C to get the plaintext M * by using the decryption algorithm and sends M * to the adversary. Thus, the probability of that the adversary wins the Game 1 is 1.
Thus, These two methods can show that the KP-ABE-ET scheme isn't OW-CCA secure.
C. THE SCHEME ISN'T SECURE FOR T-CCA
From the definition of Game 2, we know that any adversary can request key retrieve queries, decryption queries, trapdoor queries and test queries before and after the challenger generates the challenge ciphertext CT * 1 and CT * 2 . The restricted conditions are
• the adversary can't request the key retrieve query T , T , where S * ∈ T , S * ∈ T .
• CT * 1 and CT * 2 are not queried by the adversary in the decryption queries.
• CT * 1 and CT * 2 are not queried by the adversary in the test queries. When the adversary receives two challenge ciphertexts CT * 1 , CT * 2 , it requests trapdoor queries to get the trapdoor TD. Where
) produced by using three unknown random elements r 1 , r 2 ,
5 ,C * 6 ) produced by using three unknown random elements r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ∈ Z q .
Then it can compute
, and
At last, the adversary outputs 1 if the equality Thus, we show that the KP-ABE-ET scheme is not T-CCA secure.
D. FURTHERMORE DISCUSSION
The KP-ABE-ET has two functionalities: encryption & decryption and test. The concept of OW-CCA formally defines the security of the encryption & decryption algorithms, and the concept of T-CCA formally defines the security of the test algorithm. However, the definition of T-CCA in Game 2 is very strong in their paper, which causes that their scheme did satisfy this definition. Furthermore, that definition causes there will be no scheme which satisfies the T-CCA security. Because the goal of the trapdoor algorithm is to output a trapdoor which will be used to the test algorithm. That is to say, anyone who gets the trapdoors can run the test algorithm for some ciphertexts. And any adversary can request the trapdoor queries for any access structure S in Game 2 including the challenge access structure. Thus, the adversary can perform the test algorithm which can check ciphertexts to decide whether the corresponding plaintexts are the same or not. This causes that the adversary in Game 2 always wins. Thus, the definition of T-CCA is not reasonable and we should modify it as follows.
Game 3: Let A be an adversary which interacts with a challenger C. A publishes two challenged sets of attributes S, S . Here, S ∩ S = , and S and S are used for decryption and the trapdoor, respectively.
(1) Setup: The challenger C takes as input a security parameter 1 k and uses the Setup algorithm of KP-ABE-ET to generate the public parameters Param and sends to A.
(2) Phase 1: A makes queries below.
• Key retrieve queries: For access structures T i and T j , A makes many private keys queries, for all i, j S ∈ T i and S ∈ T j , respectively. And C sends the private key SK to A.
• Decryption queries: A requests many queries for ciphertexts. C runs the Decrypt algorithm and outputs the corresponding plaintext to the ciphertext or ⊥ to A.
• Trapdoor queries: For any access structures T i and T j , A requests many queries of the trapdoor, where for all i, j, S ∈ T i and S ∈ T j , respectively. C sends the trapdoor TD to A.
• Test queries: When A makes test queries for some ciphertexts, C outputs '1' for equality ciphertexts by running the test algorithm; it outputs '0', otherwise. On the other hand, although the the KP-ABE-ET scheme proposed by Zhu et al. was not OW-CCA secure, it seems that simply defining C 2 by computing M r 1 
can make their scheme satisfy OW-CCA security. Since the adversary in Game 1 cannot get Y 1 r 2 , it cannot generate a new valid C 2 from the challenged ciphertexts when C i is falsified, for i ∈ {1, 3, 4, 5}. The modification also make the scheme satisfy our weak-T-CCA security. The detailed proof of security of modification can be shown by using the method similar to [4, Ths. 2 and 3].
IV. CONCLUSION
ABE is a popular cryptographic technology to protect the security of clients' data in cloud computing. KP-ABE-ET not only utilizes the flexible property of ABE, but also can compare the ciphertexts to determine whether the corresponding plaintexts are the same or not. In this paper, we firstly showed a KP-ABE-ET scheme proposed by Zhu et al. isn't secure under OW-CCA security. Then we proved that the scheme isn't secure for T-CCA security defined in their paper yet. Finally, we pointed out the definition of T-CCA is very strong, which causes no scheme to satisfy the security model, and we redefined the T-CCA security.
APPENDIX RECALL THE KP-ABE-ET SCHEME
We recall the KP-ABE-ET scheme proposed by Zhu et al. [4] as follows.
Setup(1 k ): On input a security parameter 1 k , generate the public parameter Param and the master key MSK as follows.
• Generate two bilinear groups G 1 , G 2 with the same prime order q, and randomly generate a generator g ∈ G 1 , and a bilinear map e :
• Set A to be a universe of properties of attributes. In order to simplify the notations, set the first A elements of Z * q to be the universe, i.e., 1, 2, · · · , |A|(mod q).
• Define three secure hash functions
, and H 3 : (G 1 ) 5 × {0, 1} k+l → {0, 1} k , where the length of q is l.
• Select x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x |A| , y 1 , y 2 ∈ Z * q randomly, and then compute
Encrypt(M, Param, S, S'):
On input a message M , public parameter Param and two sets of attributes S, S (here, S ∩ S = ). Then, output the ciphertext as follows.
Randomly choose r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ∈ Z q , and then compute:
KeyGen(T,T',S, S', Param, MSK):
On input two access structures T , T , the master key MSK and two attributes sets S, S which satisfy the following conditions: T (S) = 1, T (S ) = 1 and S ∩ S = . And output the private key as follows.
(1) For every node x in T , pick a polynomial q x from top to bottom, starting from the root node r. That is,
• For every node x in T , set d x to be the degree of the polynomial q x such that d x = k x − 1, where k x is the threshold value of that node.
• Then set q r (0) = y 1 for the root node r. Select d r other points of the polynomial q r randomly to define the polynomial q r ) completely.
• For any other node x, set q x (0) to be q parent(x) (index(x)). And select d x other points randomly to completely define q x .
• For every leaf node x, output D x = g qx (0)
(2) For every node t in T , pick a polynomial q t from top to bottom, starting from the root node r . That is,
• For every node t in T , set d t to be the degree of the polynomial q t such that d t = k t − 1, where k t is the threshold value of that node.
• Then set q r (0) = y 2 for the root node r . Select d r other points of the polynomial q r randomly to define the polynomial q r (x) completely.
• For any other non-leaf node t, set q t (0) = q parent(t) (index(t)) and select d t other points randomly to define the polynomial q t completely.
• For every leaf node t, output T t = g q t (0)
x j , for j = att(t). For every node t in T , pick a polynomial q t from top to bottom, starting from the root node r . That is,
• Then set q r (0) = y 2 for the root node r . Select d r other points of the polynomial q r randomly to define the polynomial q r completely.
• For any other non-leaf node t, set q t (0) to be q parent(t) (index(t)) and select d t other points randomly to define the polynomial q t completely.
x j , for j = att(t).
Output TD = g q t (0)
x j as a trapdoor for j = att(t).
Decrypt (CT,SK, S,S'):
We use a recursive algorithm DecryptNode(CT , SK , x) to define the decryption algorithm described as follows. On input the ciphertext CT , the private key SK and a node x of the tree T , output ⊥ or a plaintext which is an element of the group G 2 .
For a leaf node x if i ∈ S for i = att(x), the calculate:
For a non-leaf node x, then the algorithm DecryptNode (CT , SK , x) runs as follows.
Let z be a child of x. DecryptNode(CT , SK , z) stores and outputs O z . Let F x be an arbitrary k x -sized subset of child nodes z such that O z =⊥ . If no the subset exists (the node is not satisfied), then return ⊥ . Otherwise, compute: , S B , C B,1 , C B,2 , C B,3 , C B,4 , C B,5 , C B,6 ). 
